Talking about Climate Change: Recognising second-round impacts in our conversation

by Sabrina Lambat

When we talk about climate change, we tend to emphasise the ‘first-round’ global impacts (rising sea levels, extreme heat or cold, etc), or the risk of finding ourselves at a fundamental, systemic tipping point. But tipping points are also socially contingent: ‘second-round’ socio-economic impacts of climate change have significant global consequences too. These have been categorized by the Stern Review (2006) in terms of conflict, migration, or capital flight due to climate pressures. Conflict and migration are major concerns, especially in terms of national or regional security. Political instability, economic weakness, food insecurity and demographic change (including migration and urbanization) are some of the key risks that should be informed by the climate discussion.

Inevitably, with climate change as the impetus, states struggle to honour the ‘social contract’ – with such a sweeping set of policies to address that they are likely to be overwhelmed by the scale of the responses required of them. Competition (sometimes violent) over resources is likely to aggravate and amplify human rights violations. Secondary effects of climate change are likely to be most evident where populations are concentrated and where the capacity to resolve attendant conflicts and disputes is weak. 

Climate change is more than a change in the weather or a drama that will be experienced by countries with weak governance or low-lying coastlines. The conversation on environmental changes addresses issues that do not respect borders and that easily spill across national boundaries, creating situations of climate conflict that would render irresponsible climate policies that fail to embrace a wider geography and a broader picture.

Water vs. Security?

Climate tensions over water already include key regions, such as the populous Bay of Bengal, Central Asia, Victoria Lake Region (Mara River), Chadian Lake Region, the Levant, and elsewhere. Rivers in these and other regions are diverted by states at the expense of other states or cities, creating political and economic stresses that are particularly problematic when a militarily strong state or region sits downstream from a weaker one.

Some cases are still managed on the basis of historical agreements, signed during colonial rule. This is true of the Nile Basin, where Egypt’s use of the river is at the cost of other weaker and poorer states such as Ethiopia. In contexts such as this, climate change effects can rekindle, old hydro-political flare-ups, illuminating numerous human rights concerns – from food and health, to the right to life, among others. Management of the Nile basin provides an important opportunity to understand how the international system might assist states to realize the right to water cooperatively, without jeopardizing security at large.

Are trade agreements relevant in this context? For example, Lesotho trades water with South Africa, bringing income to Lesotho and secondary benefits to other states downstream, such as Namibia. For the moment, these gains are not evenly distributed among the population, and climate change impacts are not yet high priorities on Lesotho’s political agenda (reflecting the fact that revenue-generating ‘hydro-diplomacy’ is led by elite interests). But as climate change reduces water levels and rainfall, a range of issues will need to be confronted: should Lesotho breach its trade agreements in order to protect its own environmental or water security? What might be the human, political or economic consequences elsewhere in the region? Gains from these types of trading agreements help sustain priorities for other human rights issues; if disparities that lead to breaches over water rights grow, will support in other adaptive strategies wane? 

Supporting Cooperation

Both regions, the Nile and Southern Africa, reflect our interest in extensive inferences of cooperation, with regard to second-round climate issues as well. These are not just elements of a standard conversation of first-round climate thinking: they include a whole host of policy debates, from competition over resources, such as water, to migration, conflict, and economic investment. These need to be addressed in their own terms.

A standard climate change conversation will not clarify such issues. For instance, no international regime guarantees protection of or assistance to climate-induced migrants; we are still caught in debates about whether terms like ‘environmental refugee’ are appropriate. Yet, why does it not seem sensible to talk about these critical issues before an international crisis forces policy decisions? Doesn’t this dearth reflect blinkered vistas of decision-making arenas, possibly illustrated in cases like the food crisis in the Horn of Africa? 

Participation and empowerment, especially of the marginalized (the most affected by climate change) is not just central to planning for the future but is also crucial in building stabler solutions. Talking about climate change implies thinking in terms of institutional flexibility and innovation as well, essential to a sustainable environment in an uncertain climate. 

Charles Darwin said: “If the misery of our poor be caused not by the laws of nature, but by our institutions, great is our sin”. As our natural climate changes, we too must adapt the thinking of our institutions, to include, to cooperate and to alleviate misery.

About the Author:

Sabrina Lambat is a researcher at the Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) where she works in climate change adaptation. She has worked on adaptation decision-making tools, migration, conflict, capital flight, human rights as well as the knowledge sharing collaboration platform www.weADAPT.org.

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Questioning Universality but Defending Human Rights?

By Ashley Drew

When we imagine a human rights defender, what springs to mind? Perhaps, we envisage an individual whose character encapsulates all that is “good”; someone who treats and views every human being as an equal and with dignity. Of late, my perception of what it means to be human rights defender has been called into question. A few months ago, I had the opportunity to meet and work with a group of individuals who identified themselves as human rights defenders (HRDs) and was shocked to learn that some expressed unwillingness to commit to the universality of human rights. One HRD claimed that some human rights did not apply in Africa. Another shared discriminatory views of Muslims when referring to the human rights situation in his country, seemingly unaware of how these views clashed with equal rights. Considering the mainstream portrayal of individuals in this line of work, it is highly concerning to have identified some who deny outright the notion of universality. This issue requires closer examination and presents an urgent need for further discussion.

Someone carrying the label of HRD refusing to commit to universality could be damaging to the mission and aims of the human rights movement. In a practical sense, any number of negative impacts could result from the actions and beliefs of an HRD rejecting universality. What if an HRD fighting for the prevention of torture did not support rights for homosexuals? How would their level of support change upon encountering a homosexual who had been tortured? While it may be challenging to predict the outcome of this hypothetical, we must at least accept the possibility that the victim would not be treated equally and with the dignity guaranteed to them under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In a broader sense, the term “human rights defender” would likely suffer also, as would the organisations, institutions and states promoting individuals under this guise.

Certain cultural obligations and incompatible belief systems are being invoked by some HRDs in order to dismiss universality. For instance, one HRD I met worked in women’s rights but said he could not support the gay rights movement as it conflicted directly with his religious beliefs, in which homosexual relations were perceived as immoral. The definition of an HRD, accepted by numerous human rights organisations, does not permit the “excuse” of cultural relativism. Supposedly an HRD is an individual defending human rights, whether it be of all or the rights of a specific group, who commits fully to the universality of human rights. Thus, the individuals described above cannot be considered as HRDs. Realistically though, how many individuals defined as HRDs, or even working in the broad human rights movement, actually fit into this narrow and somewhat dubious category?

Generally speaking, this concern with HRDs could be seen as part of a larger inconsistency within the concept of universality. Universality itself allows for these claims from the particular to occur. By particular, I mean the claim to (or rejection of) a specific, special or identity-based right, drawn from a particular context, but relying on the universal right to equality, and frequently other universalistic claims such as the right to freedom of speech and belief, which then results in a paradoxical rejection of universality. An HRD that will not commit to universality because of a professed inability to support LGBTI rights specifies their right to freedom of religious conscience as the reason for this inability. However, the act of drawing upon the right to freedom of religious conscience suggests that this HRD identifies themselves as selectively subject to universal rights.

The trouble with the current conception of HRDs is that it promotes an essentialist perspective that cannot adequately represent realities. In other fields like anthropology, complexities involving cultural relativism and universalism are accepted as an issue worth exploring. Until now, the realm of defending human rights has largely avoided this kind of scrutiny. These common assumptions must be questioned. Moreover, whether individuals defending rights fall under the definition of HRD or not, it remains an issue that there are individuals potentially damaging human rights whilst simultaneously promoting and protecting them.

About the Author:

Ashley Drew is a 2011 Research Intern at the International Council on Human Rights Policy. She recently graduated from Goldsmiths, University of London with a masters in International Studies.

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Harmonizing Ethnicity, Pluralism and Human Rights in South Sudan

© Pete Muller, AP

by Paula Mendez Keil

In a January 2011 referendum, the people of South Sudan voted by an overwhelming majority (approximately 99% of the population in favor) for secession from Sudan. After two civil wars spanning over 40 years and an estimated death toll of 2.5 million, July 9th marked the birth of the long awaited and hard-fought for dream of independence. But can this newly created state achieve pluralistic stability against a multi-ethnic backdrop? Or will its fate be that of other African states, torn by ethnic divisions and ongoing conflict? Undoubtedly the fundamental right to self-determination has been achieved, but will this result in a state which is able to fulfill the rights of the many and not just those of a few?

It would be inapropriate to extrapolate an outcome without first considering the colonial legacies of the past. Sudan, as well as other 20 African territories, has suffered the repercussions of British colonial rule throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, leaving the country in a highly volatile state since 1956. British colonial policies centered on the notion of ‘divide and conquer‘, manipulating ethnic diversity in order to pit different groups against each other and thus maintain unfettered rule of the territory. This strategy ultimately translated into a play on power inequalities and ethnic stratification as a means of social control.

Recent accusations of the northern government supplying arms to ethnic groups in the south, in an attempt to destabilize the region, seem to indicate a continuation of the British colonial strategy by the Sudanese government. The capitalization of existing ethnic stratification and internal resource allocation disputes is designed to shift attention from separatist movements. Such is the case with the oil-rich town of Abyei on the North-South divide, where outbreaks of fighting have been reported as recently as June. Clearly, these governmental tactics are intended to impede alliances from forming among diverse ethnic groups with a shared vision, in order to maintain state stability. However damaging, these schemes have evidently not succeeded in preventing secession, and hopefully will not play a role in the nation building of the state.

Since the early seventies the theory of a Fourth World in which internal colonization occurs under existing state systems, has prevailed in African political discourse. This has been the clear progression in Sudan, where the northern Muslim majority has dominated government since the country’s independence from British rule, consequently marginalizing non-Muslims in the south. Although Sudan ratified the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights in 1986, whose Article 2 declares that “every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, color, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status” (emphasis added), a consistently contradictory policy of discrimination has persisted.

The ethnic heterogeneity in South Sudan prompts the question of future political stability. Now it will be the responsibility of the newly formed government to successfully address and accommodate ethnic differences among its five prominent ethnic groups—Dinka, Nuer, Azande, Bari, and Shilluk/Anwak—and other communities. With respect to human rights, the principle of non-discrimination is indispensable to ensuring harmony in a pluralistic and multi-ethnic country. As the African Charter reaffirms, every state has the duty to eliminate all forms of discrimination and guarantee all rights without distinction. The sense of insecurity and vulnerability brought forth by change quite often results in intolerance and turmoil among rival groups. For this very reason the South Sudanese government should be wary of the instability periods of transition bring to stratified societies, which tend to exacerbate preexisting tensions, and avoid repeating errors committed by the government of undivided Sudan. In particular, it is critical to ensure that concrete problems afflicting its people, such as access to land, water, and political representation are not ethnicized and thereby exacerbated, which in the case of Darfur has led to genocide and massive internal displacement with tragic human rights consequences.

Far too often, states have tended to turn a blind eye to human rights abuses under the pretext of cultural autonomy. Rather than giving into false dichotomies between cultural traditions and human rights values, the nascent government should take the opportunity to create not only an adequate legal framework for human rights, but also a judicial and political system which promotes a culture of respect for human rights, especially of women and minorities, building on both human rights and cultural values that promote dignity and equality, within and between groups.

A particular challenge will be to remove any biases entrenched within the inherited judicial and political system, including those with colonial antecedents, which may shift the balance of power towards any one particular ethnic group. A related concern is corruption, reportedly widespread in the capital, Juba, which increases the potential for human rights violations. It is thus essential to establish power-sharing mechanisms which provide for transparency, accountability and participation. This is central to the realization of human rights and the promotion of inclusive pluralism by preventing any one ethnic group from disproportionately benefitting from natural resources or political power in the newest addition to Africa.

About the Author:

Paula Mendez Keil is a 2011 Research Intern at the International Council on Human Rights Policy. She is currently completing a Master’s in International Affairs at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva.

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Dare to speak its name: sexual orientation, gender identity and human rights at the UN

by Kate Donald

On June 17th, the UN Human Rights Council passed a resolution on human rights, sexuality and gender identity, which followed a joint statement on these issues at the March session of the Council.

The resolution has been hailed as 'groundbreaking'; is it really cause for celebration?

It is a sad fact that this is the first UN resolution to specifically focus on human rights violations based on sexual orientation and gender identity. The inclusion of gender identity is arguably a particularly progressive step forward. However, the content of the resolution is otherwise fairly weak.

Other than affirming the universality of human rights, the resolution merely 'express[es] grave concern' at acts of violence and discrimination committed on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity, rather than, for example, declaring such discrimination and violence a simple human rights violation or demanding that states take action against such events. Owing to this 'grave concern', it takes the less-than-radical action of requesting the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights to write a study, deciding to convene a panel discussion next year, and avowing to 'remain seized of the issue.'

Human rights law has always prohibited discrimination as one of its most basic tenets. The resolution is consistent with other regional and national jurisprudence and, in fact, less progressive than some. Yet, the resolution only just passed, with 23 votes – 19 states voted against and 3 abstained.  The rhetoric of opponents is startling – although generally their statements do not openly question the universality of human rights, they implicitly and explicitly deny that these categories of 'homosexual' or 'transgender' exist or are legitimate, and that the behaviour associated with them is worthy of protection. The representative from Nigeria criticized South Africa (who tabled the resolution) for breaking ranks with African countries and siding with 'the West', claiming that more than 90 percent of the African people did not support this resolution.

There is no doubt that sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI) issues are one of the big weak spots in the UN system, a victim of cultural relativity, persistent counter-lobbying by the Vatican and a motley coalition of Arab and African States, as well as a weak political commitment from the supposedly more progressive States.  Moreover, there is no general upwards trend or 'progress', but rather marked inconsistency. In the same Human Rights Council session, a reference to "women who face sexuality-related violence" was removed from the final version of another resolution focused on the elimination of violence against women. Only in 2009, the members of a UN General Assembly sub-committee responsible for human rights issues voted without precedent to retrospectively remove a reference to 'sexual orientation' from a paragraph enumerating vulnerable populations in a 10-year-old resolution on extrajudicial executions. (Thankfully, the reference was restored in December last year after a strong civil society campaign.) De facto and de jure discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity is still widespread and widely tolerated around the world and includes state-legitimated or -perpetrated violence. This year’s report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women emphasised that lesbian, bisexual and transgender women have greater vulnerability to  a number of violations, including murder and appalling sexual violence.

Just a week before the Human Rights Council resolution, a Political Declaration on HIV/AIDS was adopted at the UN High Level Meeting on AIDS. This was a big step forward in terms of committing to a rights-based approach to the HIV response. Startlingly, it marked the first time men who have sex with men have been explicitly mentioned as a population at higher risk of HIV in a political declaration on AIDS. However, it fails to make any mention of transgender people.

Clearly, the UN and the international human rights regime, which purports to protect the most vulnerable people in the world, has failed to move consistently forward on this issue. However, no matter how overdue or incomplete, this resolution is an encouraging sign and hopefully stronger action will emerge from it. What is needed is more robust political leadership. The stance of the Obama administration is welcome in this regard, as is that of South Africa and various South American countries who have provided leadership on this issue at the Human Rights Council.

Hopefully this marks a significant step in the establishment of an international norm that will eventually take hold, making it more difficult, and eventually impossible, for States to justify or maintain discriminatory laws or to fail to take meaningful action against discrimination or violence against LGBT people.

Amongst the shocking facts the OHCHR study will have to report, is that seven countries still apply the death penalty to homosexuals, and 76 criminalise same-sex sexual relations. Clearly, this struggle is urgent.

Further Reading:

ICHRP (2009). 
Sexuality and Human Rights: Discussion Paper   

• The ICHRP project on sexuality, health and human rights, undertaken in conjunction with the WHO, will map existing laws, policies and jurisprudence from around the world relating to sexual orientation and gender identity, and other issues  such as sex work and regulation of marriage. Aiming to foster the respect, protection and fulfillment of human rights related to sexuality and sexual health, it will create a knowledge resource base for actors working on sexuality and human rights policy.

• See also the Yogyakarta Principles for how international human rights law can be applied in relation to SOGI issues.

About the Author:

Kate Donald is Research Associate at the International Council on Human Rights Policy. She works on the ICHRP project on sexuality, health and human rights.

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